email-enrichment
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from external web sources via
web_search_live(snippets and AI summaries) andweb_enrich_live(content from GitHub commit patches, such ashttps://github.com/OWNER/REPO/commit/SHA.patch). - Boundary markers: The skill does not explicitly define delimiters or specific 'ignore' instructions to separate retrieved data from agent instructions, increasing the risk of the agent misinterpreting data as commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has extensive capabilities including executing JavaScript via the
executetool, performing network requests viacallTool, and writing progress state to the local file system. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering logic is described for the raw content fetched from external URLs before processing.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes runtime generation and execution of JavaScript code to coordinate tool calls.
- All Crustdata tool interactions are encapsulated within
execute({ code })scripts. These scripts are generated based on templates to handle batching, parallel processing of requests, and complex verification logic. - While this is the established method for using the Crustdata MCP server, it involves the agent assembling and running executable code dynamically.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches information from external repositories and search engines to resolve contact details.
- It specifically targets GitHub to retrieve raw patch files for email extraction from technical profiles.
- These external references target well-known services (GitHub, professional networks) and are documented as part of the contact verification and enrichment logic.
Audit Metadata