icp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from LinkedIn profiles and social posts via Crustdata APIs and writes this information into local configuration files (
config/persona-profile.mdandconfig/gtm-config.md). These files are then consumed by other GTM-related skills, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if the source data contains malicious instructions. - Ingestion points: External data from LinkedIn profiles and posts fetched via the
person_enrichandsocial_post_list_livetools. - Boundary markers: The skill uses markdown structure for the configuration files but does not explicitly mention escaping logic for the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute code, call remote tools, and write files to the local filesystem.
- Sanitization: Relies on a mandatory human-in-the-loop review step where the agent must show the persona to the user for verification before writing files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
executetool to run JavaScript code that orchestrates tool calls and processes data. The provided code snippets are limited to legitimate business logic for data enrichment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references the author's own infrastructure at
crustdata.comandinstall.crustdata.comfor data enrichment and MCP server installation. These references are consistent with the skill's functionality and use the vendor's official domains.
Audit Metadata