sales-outreach
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources including social media posts, company news articles, and job descriptions.
- Ingestion points: Data is pulled via
social_post_list_live,company_enrich, andjob_searchtools as documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict delimiters or clear "ignore instructions" markers for the external text before it is processed by the model.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes an
executetool for JavaScript execution and generates CSV files for export. - Sanitization: While the "No-Slop Rule" provides output filtering for AI-typical phrasing, there is no evidence of input sanitization or escaping for the ingested social media or news content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on an
executetool to run JavaScript code for orchestrating complex tool calls and data transformations. - Evidence: Multiple JavaScript snippets in
SKILL.mddemonstrate logic for filtering, mapping, and batching tool responses within theexecuteenvironment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and fetches components from external vendor-controlled sources.
- Evidence: The
README.mdinstructs users to download a.skillfile from the vendor's GitHub releases (github.com/crustdata/skills/releases) and connect to a remote MCP server (install.crustdata.com/mcp). These are official resources belonging to the skill's author.
Audit Metadata