solana — ship production Solana code

Opinionated, security-first Solana development (2026 stack). (Distilled in our own way from the Solana Foundation's solana-dev-skill, MIT. The full vulnerability catalog + version/error troubleshooting is in references/security-and-troubleshooting.md.)

The stack (defaults)

Client: @solana/kit (v5.x), not legacy @solana/web3.js. New code uses Kit types (Address, Kit signers, Kit RPC). Isolate any legacy web3.js (PublicKey, Keypair, Connection) behind the @solana/web3-compat boundary — zone src/solana/kit/ vs src/solana/web3/. Never mix Address and PublicKey app-wide.
Programs: Anchor by default; Pinocchio only when compute / binary-size / parsing control is critical.
Frontend: framework-kit + @solana/react-hooks + Wallet Standard discovery.
Codegen: describe programs with Codama (Anchor IDL → Codama → Kit TS client; native Rust → Shank → Codama). Never hand-write IDLs or Borsh layouts for programs you own; commit the generated code.

Anchor essentials

Accounts: #[account(init, payer = payer, space = 8 + T::INIT_SPACE)]; the 8-byte discriminator is auto-added.
PDA validation: seeds = [b"vault", owner.key().as_ref()], bump; ownership via has_one = authority.
Realloc: realloc = new_space, realloc::payer = payer, realloc::zero = true (zero clears old data when shrinking).
Errors: #[error_code] enum + #[msg("...")] + require!(cond, MyError::X).
PDA-signed CPI: let seeds = &[b"vault".as_ref(), &[ctx.bumps.vault]]; CpiContext::new_with_signer(...). Use a typed Program<'info, T> to validate CPI targets (prevents arbitrary-CPI attacks). (v0.32→v1 migration: CpiContext::new now takes a program ID, not an AccountInfo.)