skills/cryskai/crysk/crysk-loop/Gen Agent Trust Hub

crysk-loop

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONOBFUSCATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill spawns a separate, isolated sub-agent (an "adjudicator") using a dedicated system prompt provided in adjudicator.md. This sub-agent is dynamically tasked with verifying repository state and ruling on triage arguments.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill executes npx -y crysk, which fetches and runs code directly from the npm registry. It also downloads remote CI artifacts using gh run download to serve as input for the triage process, creating a dependency on external data sources.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub PR comments (specifically <!-- crysk-finding ... --> markers). This creates an attack surface where a malicious finding could influence the agent's decision-making or lead it to apply incorrect code "fixes."
  • Ingestion points: GitHub PR comments and CI run artifacts.
  • Boundary markers: Uses specific HTML-style comment tags to identify findings but does not describe sanitization of the finding's body text.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file system modification, git push, posting GitHub comments, and execution of CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the finding content before it is processed by the agent or adjudicator.
  • [OBFUSCATION]: The skill utilizes URL encoding for file paths within finding markers and includes shell snippets that decode Base64 data from the GitHub API to inspect workflow configurations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill heavily utilizes shell-based tooling, including git, gh, and npx, to automate the PR review lifecycle and repository updates.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 08:00 AM