call-agent

SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s routing purpose is coherent, but it expands trust to several external CLIs and includes at least one ambiguous/unverifiable dependency (`notebooklm`). No clear credential theft or covert exfiltration is shown, yet the external delegation model and unverifiable peer requirement make the skill high-risk to install/use.

This is operational documentation for invoking Codex and does not itself contain evident malware. The use of --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox is a significant security concern because it can permit actions beyond intended isolation, especially if prompts or output paths are attacker-controlled. The referenced scripts must be reviewed for argument quoting, path validation, credential exposure, and process permissions before use.

The script is a wrapper around Codex image generation and contains no direct malware indicators such as credential theft, data exfiltration, persistence, or obfuscated payloads. However, it invokes Codex with --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox and passes unsanitized user instructions to that agent, which can permit unintended filesystem or other actions. Use of this wrapper should be restricted to trusted prompts and environments, and the dangerous bypass flag should be removed or replaced with narrowly scoped permissions.

The provided file is an automation wrapper, not apparent malware. It intentionally delegates implementation to Claude with broad workspace access and Bash, Edit, and Write capabilities. This creates a meaningful operational security risk if inputs, helper scripts, the Claude binary, or the working directory are untrusted, but the fragment contains no direct exfiltration, credential theft, persistence, obfuscation, or destructive behavior. Review the helper scripts and enforce trusted working directories and task inputs before use.