simless
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to download source code from a third-party GitHub repository to the local machine.
- Evidence:
git clone https://github.com/abacusai/simless ~/Documents/Git/simlessinSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires building external software from source and executing commands that modify system-level development configurations.
- Evidence:
swift build -c releaseandln -sf "$PWD/.build/release/simless" ~/.local/bin/simlessfor local binary installation. - Evidence:
xcodebuild ... -allowProvisioningUpdates -allowProvisioningDeviceRegistration buildwhich modifies Apple Developer account state and registers the host hardware. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions use strong imperative language to override standard agent behavior and tool selection policies.
- Evidence: "Do not boot the iOS Simulator for screen checks or unit tests. Use simless."
- Evidence: "simless is the default for every iOS test during development... The simulator is for the final pass only."
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface where it ingests and processes SwiftUI source code to generate accessibility trees and renders, which could be exploited if the project code contains malicious patterns.
- Ingestion points: Reads SwiftUI view files and fixtures (
SimlessFixtures.swift) to perform renders. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions for separating untrusted project code from the agent's logic.
- Capability inventory: Can execute shell commands via the
simlessCLI, modify project files (simless init), and triggerxcodebuildprocesses. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the SwiftUI source code is described before processing.
Audit Metadata