client-intake
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from client interviews and using it to generate structured outputs and commands.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the system through client narratives and responses to intake questions described in
SKILL.md(Step 1: Practice Area Routing and Step 2: Practice-Area Specific Intake). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions to the agent to ignore or escape instructions embedded within the user-provided legal narratives.
- Capability inventory: The skill produces executable-style command blocks (e.g.,
/legal-clinic:deadlines --add) as a 'mandatory deliverable'. If these outputs are processed by other automated tools or the agent's command line, they provide a vector for command argument injection. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, filtering, or validation for the data interpolated into critical fields such as
case,description, orsourcewithin the generated deadline commands.
Audit Metadata