invention-intake
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local filesystem paths located within a hidden directory in the user's home folder.
- Evidence: The skill reads from and writes to files in
~/.claude/plugins/config/claude-for-legal/ip-legal/, includingCLAUDE.mdand case-specificmatter.mdfiles. - Risk: Accessing hidden configuration and data directories exposes internal application settings and potentially confidential legal matter information to the agent's context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface by processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to capture and read "invention disclosures" provided by the user in the form of text or uploaded files in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions to delimit the user-provided disclosure or to ignore any embedded instructions within that content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read and write capabilities targeting the
~/.claudeconfiguration hierarchy, which could be abused if the agent follows malicious instructions hidden in a disclosure. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested disclosure content is described before it is used to influence the screening process and output creation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata