tabular-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core function is to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted third-party documents (e.g., contracts, vendor files). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in documents could attempt to influence the agent's output or behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Local document folders, Virtual Data Rooms (VDR), and cloud document providers (Google Drive, Feishu, Nutstore) as specified in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill employs a strictly typed YAML schema (.review-schema.yaml) and mandates verbatim quoting of source text to distinguish between interpreted data and raw evidence.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can write various file types (.xlsx, .csv, .md, .yaml), access network APIs for Google Sheets, and execute Python snippets for spreadsheet generation.
  • Sanitization: The skill contains explicit 'Formula Injection Defense' instructions in references/excel-output.md and references/gsheets-output.md, requiring all document-sourced text to be prefixed with a single quote (') and properly escaped.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python scripts (e.g., python3 -c "import openpyxl") and the openpyxl library to dynamically generate and format Excel workbooks based on the extracted data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a step to check for and potentially install the openpyxl package via pip3 if it is not already present in the environment.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses local configuration files within ~/.claude/plugins/config/ to load deal contexts, diligence structures, and thresholds. While this is standard for the 'Claude for Legal' framework, it involves reading sensitive internal configuration data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 07:39 AM