tabular-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's core function is to ingest and process large volumes of untrusted third-party documents (e.g., contracts, vendor files). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions hidden in documents could attempt to influence the agent's output or behavior.
- Ingestion points: Local document folders, Virtual Data Rooms (VDR), and cloud document providers (Google Drive, Feishu, Nutstore) as specified in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill employs a strictly typed YAML schema (
.review-schema.yaml) and mandates verbatim quoting of source text to distinguish between interpreted data and raw evidence. - Capability inventory: The agent can write various file types (.xlsx, .csv, .md, .yaml), access network APIs for Google Sheets, and execute Python snippets for spreadsheet generation.
- Sanitization: The skill contains explicit 'Formula Injection Defense' instructions in
references/excel-output.mdandreferences/gsheets-output.md, requiring all document-sourced text to be prefixed with a single quote (') and properly escaped. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Python scripts (e.g.,
python3 -c "import openpyxl") and theopenpyxllibrary to dynamically generate and format Excel workbooks based on the extracted data. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions include a step to check for and potentially install the
openpyxlpackage viapip3if it is not already present in the environment. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses local configuration files within
~/.claude/plugins/config/to load deal contexts, diligence structures, and thresholds. While this is standard for the 'Claude for Legal' framework, it involves reading sensitive internal configuration data.
Audit Metadata