youtube-remotion-clips
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
subprocessmodule to orchestrate media processing workflows. It invokes external CLI tools includingffmpeg,ffprobe,yt-dlp(via its Python module), andnodeto perform video encoding, metadata extraction, transcription, and Remotion rendering. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external network services to acquire media. It fetches metadata from the Invidious API to discover mirror instances and performs multi-threaded, range-based downloads from YouTube and various mirror hosts.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from YouTube video content and Whisper-generated transcripts. Although it does not directly execute text from transcripts, these outputs are used to drive agent decisions for clip selection and image prompt generation, which represents a potential indirect injection surface.
- Ingestion points: YouTube URLs and media files, Whisper transcripts (
scripts/transcribe.py). - Boundary markers: None implemented for transcript content.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (
ffmpeg,yt-dlp,node), file system writes, and network operations. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is applied to the transcribed text before it is returned to the agent context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a Node.js-based rendering engine (Remotion) to generate video frames. It also evaluates JavaScript within an isolated browser session via the
agent-browsertool to fetch advertised backend routes from media mirrors.
Audit Metadata