youtube-remotion-clips

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the subprocess module to orchestrate media processing workflows. It invokes external CLI tools including ffmpeg, ffprobe, yt-dlp (via its Python module), and node to perform video encoding, metadata extraction, transcription, and Remotion rendering.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill interacts with external network services to acquire media. It fetches metadata from the Invidious API to discover mirror instances and performs multi-threaded, range-based downloads from YouTube and various mirror hosts.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data from YouTube video content and Whisper-generated transcripts. Although it does not directly execute text from transcripts, these outputs are used to drive agent decisions for clip selection and image prompt generation, which represents a potential indirect injection surface.
  • Ingestion points: YouTube URLs and media files, Whisper transcripts (scripts/transcribe.py).
  • Boundary markers: None implemented for transcript content.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution (ffmpeg, yt-dlp, node), file system writes, and network operations.
  • Sanitization: No specific sanitization or filtering is applied to the transcribed text before it is returned to the agent context.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a Node.js-based rendering engine (Remotion) to generate video frames. It also evaluates JavaScript within an isolated browser session via the agent-browser tool to fetch advertised backend routes from media mirrors.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 4, 2026, 06:13 AM