manage-config
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/_cmd_quality_phases.pyexecutes shell commands usingsubprocess.run. It calls the internal script.plan/execute-script.pywith a fixed list of arguments to perform a CI merge-queue probe. While the arguments are hardcoded, it utilizes system-level execution capabilities. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface because it processes untrusted user narratives to determine configuration logic.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted user narrative text is read from
request.md(viascripts/_cmd_domain_detect.py) and passed through CLI arguments (viascripts/_cmd_aspect_classify.py). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the processing logic to ignore adversarial commands embedded within the narratives.
- Capability inventory: The results of these classifications influence the modification of
.plan/marshal.jsonand can cause the execution-manifest composer to drop critical build, quality-gate, or test steps if an implementation request is misclassified as analysis or planning. - Sanitization: The input is tokenized and matched against keyword tables using overlap scoring. While heuristic-first, this lacks robust filtering against adversarial text designed to manipulate the classification outcome.
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