manage-files

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The read command outputs raw file content without wrapping or boundary markers, creating a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection.
  • Ingestion points: The cmd_read function in scripts/manage-files.py reads and prints file content directly.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; output is raw as explicitly stated in SKILL.md ("Raw file content (no wrapping)").
  • Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities for file mutation (write, remove, mkdir), filesystem discovery, and IDE launcher execution.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the script prints the file content verbatim to the agent's context.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The discover command facilitates filesystem enumeration beyond the intended plan scope.
  • The command accepts an absolute --root directory for glob-based searches (discover_parser.add_argument('--root', ...)), enabling the agent to search for sensitive files (e.g., credentials or configuration) across the entire reachable filesystem.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The open-in-ide subcommand invokes external binaries using system commands.
  • The script uses subprocess.run to launch IDE applications (VS Code, Cursor, PyCharm, etc.). While it avoids shell=True, it accepts an absolute --path argument that is passed directly to the launcher, which could be abused to interact with sensitive files or potentially trigger vulnerabilities in the IDE's CLI handling.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 11, 2026, 07:12 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — manage-files