computer-vision-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted media files for object detection and tracking, which presents a surface for potential instructions embedded in file metadata or visual content to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/video_analyzer.pyreads video frames viacv2.VideoCapture. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instruction filtering applied to the content of processed frames.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-writing capabilities and model-training logic.
- Sanitization: Input media files are not sanitized for malicious metadata or adversarial visual patterns targeting LLM instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Reference documentation suggests installing external dependencies from the internet.
- The
references/yolo-guide.mdfile suggests installing theultralyticspackage via pip. - The
references/tracking-algorithms.mdfile suggests cloning theabewley/sortrepository from GitHub to implement tracking. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The model training and inference scripts load PyTorch weight files (
.pt), which utilize thepicklemodule for serialization. Loading weights from untrusted sources could lead to arbitrary code execution due to the nature of the pickle format, though this is a standard requirement for the skill's primary purpose.
Audit Metadata