port-daddy

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence mechanism through system services. The skill provides commands such as pd install and scripts like preflight.sh to register and manage a background daemon via macOS launchd, allowing the agent to maintain a presence across sessions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Arbitrary shell command execution via the fleet engine. The pd-fleet.yml configuration (detailed in schemas/pd-fleet.schema.md) allows the definition of agents using a custom backend where the prompt field is executed directly as a shell command.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamic execution of tasks by background agents. The fleet mechanism facilitates spawning sub-agents (e.g., claude-cli) with specific tool access like Bash(npm test*), allowing automated code execution triggered by events such as git commits.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Local management of encryption keys. The daemon generates and manages an AES-256-GCM master key at ~/.port-daddy/master.key (referenced in SKILL.md and scripts/preflight.sh) used for encrypting and decrypting session notes.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: External data transmission capability. The skill supports an inconsistency_webhook for Slack (found in assets/.portdaddyrc.starter), which provides a channel for sending internal state or coordination data to an external service.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection attack surface. The coordination architecture (using notes and tuples) creates a shared memory space where data written by one agent can influence the subsequent behavior of other agents, such as the qa or cartographer agents, without explicit sanitization layers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 30, 2026, 04:56 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — port-daddy