port-daddy
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence mechanism through system services. The skill provides commands such as
pd installand scripts likepreflight.shto register and manage a background daemon via macOSlaunchd, allowing the agent to maintain a presence across sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Arbitrary shell command execution via the fleet engine. The
pd-fleet.ymlconfiguration (detailed inschemas/pd-fleet.schema.md) allows the definition of agents using acustombackend where thepromptfield is executed directly as a shell command. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamic execution of tasks by background agents. The fleet mechanism facilitates spawning sub-agents (e.g.,
claude-cli) with specific tool access likeBash(npm test*), allowing automated code execution triggered by events such as git commits. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Local management of encryption keys. The daemon generates and manages an AES-256-GCM master key at
~/.port-daddy/master.key(referenced inSKILL.mdandscripts/preflight.sh) used for encrypting and decrypting session notes. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: External data transmission capability. The skill supports an
inconsistency_webhookfor Slack (found inassets/.portdaddyrc.starter), which provides a channel for sending internal state or coordination data to an external service. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection attack surface. The coordination architecture (using
notesandtuples) creates a shared memory space where data written by one agent can influence the subsequent behavior of other agents, such as theqaorcartographeragents, without explicit sanitization layers.
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