video-processing-editing

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/video_editor.py uses the Python eval() function to process the r_frame_rate metadata field returned by ffprobe. Since this metadata originates from the input video file, a maliciously crafted file with a forged frame rate field could potentially execute arbitrary Python code when the metadata is extracted and evaluated.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses subprocess.run() across multiple files (scripts/video_editor.py, scripts/audio_mixer.py, scripts/batch_processor.py, scripts/quality_assessment.py, scripts/thumbnail_generator.py, scripts/motion_graphics.py, scripts/timelapse_creator.py) to execute FFmpeg and ffprobe commands. While this is the primary purpose of the skill, the execution of shell commands on user-provided files presents a significant capability surface.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect instruction injection through the processing of untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: External video, audio, and image files provided to the scripts as inputs (e.g., in video_editor.py, batch_processor.py).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or warnings are used to instruct the agent to ignore embedded metadata or structural data within the processed files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (via FFmpeg/ffprobe) and run arbitrary Python code (via eval() in video_editor.py).
  • Sanitization: While most subprocess calls use list-based arguments, the use of eval() on external metadata in scripts/video_editor.py bypasses safe handling and creates an exploitable path for malicious content embedded in file headers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 23, 2026, 02:33 PM