skills/cursor/plugins/interrogate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

interrogate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes code and diffs provided by the user, which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the reviewed code could attempt to influence the reviewer subagents.\n
  • Ingestion points: Source code and git diffs are read in SKILL.md (Step 1) and passed to reviewers.\n
  • Boundary markers: The references/reviewer-prompt.md template uses markdown headers to delimit the code under review, but it lacks explicit instructions to ignore any embedded directives within that code.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent spawns multiple subagents via the Task tool and synthesizes their findings. The subagents are configured with readonly: true, limiting their ability to modify the environment.\n
  • Sanitization: The input code is interpolated directly into the prompt template without sanitization or escaping mechanisms.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to interact with the version control system and manage its own configuration.\n
  • Evidence: The skill executes git diff to gather review context and is instructed to autonomously open pull requests to update model configurations if a model slug is found to be invalid.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses configuration files within the user's home directory to determine model routing.\n
  • Evidence: It reads model lists from ~/.cursor/rules/pstack-models.mdc to configure the subagent spawning process.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 2, 2026, 06:55 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — interrogate