autonomous-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions in SKILL.md and configuration in skill.yaml define a 'silent mode' that explicitly states 'do not stop to ask the user' (默认开启静默模式,不停止询问用户). This undermines the standard AI safety principle of human-in-the-loop and user consent.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides an autonomous execution framework that includes 'auto-healing' with up to 999 attempts and the ability to dynamically search and generate new workflows from the internet. When combined with the 'never_stop' and 'silent_mode' flags, this creates a risk of high-frequency, unreviewed command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The 'never_stop: true' and 'auto_execute: on_trigger: true' configurations in skill.yaml are designed to override the agent's default behavior of waiting for user confirmation between steps, effectively creating an unrestricted execution loop.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external sources (official docs, GitHub issues, technical communities) and automatically convert this information into executable workflows.
  • Ingestion points: Network searches and GitHub repository reading during the 'Knowledge Research' and 'Workflow Matcher' layers.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions to distinguish between research data and trusted instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (creating directories, index.json, templates) and execute tasks/repairs.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or verification of the content fetched from P3 (GitHub) or P4 (Tech Community) sources before it is used to generate executable steps.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 26, 2026, 11:19 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — autonomous-agent