literary-ghostwriter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user data through several commands, including
/文豪 <作家> <选题>,/literary <author> <topic>, and/文豪 润色 <文本>. Ingestion points: User-provided topics, story text for polishing, and project names are directly incorporated into the agent's context. Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific 'ignore' rules for user-supplied content during the imitation and editing workflows. Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to read/write files within project directories and execute a shared memory CLI tool. Sanitization: There are no specific instructions for the agent to sanitize or validate the content of the user-provided text before processing. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local script
../_shared/memory/cli.pyfor session persistence. The agent is instructed to invoke this script usingpythonat the start of a session and after user operations to load and save state. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile provides command-line templates that pipe user-controlled strings (like<项目名>) into a Python script viaecho. This pattern, if implemented naively by an agent, could lead to command injection if the user-supplied project name contains shell metacharacters.
Audit Metadata