skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
subprocessmodule to manage the development environment and execution lifecycle. - Evidence includes calls to
claude -pfor testing skill triggers inscripts/run_eval.py,npx tsxfor running backtests in implementation plans, andlsofto manage network ports ineval-viewer/generate_review.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires network access to interact with external APIs.
scripts/improve_description.pyandscripts/run_loop.pyuse theanthropicPython SDK to communicate with remote AI models for description optimization.- The evaluation viewer in
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlloads thexlsx.full.min.jslibrary fromcdn.sheetjs.comat runtime to render spreadsheet data. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript starts a local HTTP server (defaulting to port 3117) to provide a user interface for reviewing results. - This script reads contents from the evaluation workspace, including text files, images, PDFs, and spreadsheets, and serves them via the local server.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes and executes user-provided data through subagents.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
evals/evals.json(test prompts) andfeedback.json(user reviews). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimitation or 'ignore instructions' warnings are applied to the test prompts before they are passed to subagents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for subprocess execution, file system modification (
Path.write_text,shutil.copytree), and network communication. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping performed on the content of test prompts before execution.
Audit Metadata