jev
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes arbitrary data provided in the
statefield of the input JSON, which could contain instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
stateparameter in the request JSON (defined in SKILL.md) accepts arbitrary data from users or external sources. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to separate untrusted data from the agent's instructions within the
statefield. - Capability inventory: The skill executes the
jevCLI tool and transmits data to the TypeSafe AI external API. - Sanitization: No specific validation, escaping, or sanitization steps are mentioned to verify the content of the
statefield before it is passed to the CLI. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes the
jevCLI tool orswift run jevon the host system. While this is the intended mechanism for the skill's functionality, it involves executing local commands based on structured input. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits the
statecontent to the TypeSafe AI service. While this is the primary purpose of the skill and is documented with a privacy warning, users should be cautious about including sensitive or private information in thestateobject as it is sent to an external third-party domain.
Audit Metadata