goap-agent

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates extensive use of system-level tools and shell commands for development and testing tasks. Evidence: agents.md identifies Bash, Read, Write, and Edit as primary tools for feature-implementer, debugger, and other task agents. Evidence: patterns.md and examples.md include execution of local scripts (e.g., ./scripts/code-quality.sh) and build tools (e.g., cargo nextest).
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The orchestration workflow involves retrieving content from external sources. Evidence: skills.md and methodology.md reference the web-doc-resolver skill for researching documentation and best practices during the initial analysis phase.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to the integration of untrusted external data into high-privilege execution plans. Ingestion points: Research phase utilizing web-doc-resolver to fetch external web content (patterns.md, skills.md). Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not define clear delimiters or safety prompts to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in research data. Capability inventory: Agents have access to destructive and powerful tools including Bash, Write, and Edit on the local filesystem (agents.md). Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of validating or filtering content retrieved from the web before it influences the plan decomposition and assignment.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 12, 2026, 03:11 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — goap-agent