principled-change
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by requiring the agent to process data from potentially untrusted sources like external library issue trackers and source code.
- Ingestion points: Library source code, changelogs, and issue trackers are explicitly listed as sources for investigation (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are provided for processing this external data.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to modify codebase files and execute shell commands for testing and diagnostics.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or input validation is prescribed for content retrieved from external trackers.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses instructions that promote high autonomy and the bypassing of standard user confirmation loops for technical decisions.
- Evidence: "Technical decisions are yours, and you make them without asking me."
- Evidence: "A question gets a worse answer from me than your own investigation would give you."
- Evidence: "Errors, timeouts, missing tools... are ordinary obstacles, not reasons to stop."
- Risk: This reduces human-in-the-loop oversight, potentially allowing an agent to perform complex refactors or design changes influenced by malicious input without user review until the final report.
Audit Metadata