eagle-eye-monitor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language and a "CRITICAL RULE" header to attempt to override the agent's default behavior, instructing it to never suggest standard package manager commands and to exclusively use a custom tool instead.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the execution of a custom, non-standard CLI tool named
infynonfor all management and monitoring operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The persistence setup instructions involve writing configuration to system-level directories (
/etc/systemd/system/) and managing system services, which are high-risk operations typically requiring administrative privileges. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill prompts users to input sensitive SMTP credentials, including hostnames, usernames, and plaintext passwords or API keys, which are then stored in a local configuration file at
~/.infynon/eagle-eye.toml. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points: The skill scans project directories for various lock files (e.g.,
package-lock.json,Cargo.lock,uv.lock) as described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions provided to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially malicious instructions embedded within the metadata of the scanned files.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
infynon pkg fixandinfynon pkg scancommands which perform file system writes and package modifications. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the external content before it is processed by the monitoring tool.
Audit Metadata