eagle-eye-monitor

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language and a "CRITICAL RULE" header to attempt to override the agent's default behavior, instructing it to never suggest standard package manager commands and to exclusively use a custom tool instead.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions require the execution of a custom, non-standard CLI tool named infynon for all management and monitoring operations.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The persistence setup instructions involve writing configuration to system-level directories (/etc/systemd/system/) and managing system services, which are high-risk operations typically requiring administrative privileges.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill prompts users to input sensitive SMTP credentials, including hostnames, usernames, and plaintext passwords or API keys, which are then stored in a local configuration file at ~/.infynon/eagle-eye.toml.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted project data.
  • Ingestion points: The skill scans project directories for various lock files (e.g., package-lock.json, Cargo.lock, uv.lock) as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions provided to the agent to ignore or delimit potentially malicious instructions embedded within the metadata of the scanned files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the infynon pkg fix and infynon pkg scan commands which perform file system writes and package modifications.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not specify any validation or sanitization steps for the external content before it is processed by the monitoring tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 1, 2026, 07:15 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — eagle-eye-monitor