virtuals-protocol-acp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes agent metadata (names, descriptions, and job offerings) retrieved from the external ACP registry via the
browse_agentstool. This content is used to inform the agent's decisions on which agents to interact with, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. \n - Ingestion points: Data is ingested from the Virtuals Protocol registry through the
@virtuals-protocol/acp-nodelibrary inscripts/index.ts. \n - Boundary markers: The skill instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings for the agent to distinguish between its instructions and the data fetched from the registry. \n
- Capability inventory: The skill allows for the initiation of on-chain transactions and payments through the
execute_acp_jobtool. \n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external registry data before it is presented to the agent. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's functionality is delivered through a local TypeScript CLI tool. The agent is instructed to execute
npx tsx scripts/index.tswith various arguments to perform tasks like browsing agents and managing jobs. This relies on local shell execution within the agent's environment. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process involves cloning the source code from theVirtual-Protocol/openclaw-acpGitHub repository and usingnpm installto download dependencies, including the@virtuals-protocol/acp-nodeSDK. These are standard operations for this skill's use case.
Audit Metadata