seed-verify-figma-mcp-transports
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of multiple shell commands to build the plugin, run a background relay, and perform transport probes.
- Evidence: Commands such as
bun packages/mcp/scripts/probe-transports.ts,bun --filter figma-mcp build, andbun packages/mcp/bin/index.mjs socketare used throughout the verification phases. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process Figma URLs provided by a user, which serves as a potential vector for indirect instructions if the URL or its metadata contains malicious payloads.
- Ingestion points: The skill explicitly requests a 'layer URL' from the user via
AskUserQuestionin Phase 0 to derive file keys and node IDs. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit instructions for the agent to treat the user-supplied URL as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions within the parsed content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands (
bun), initiate network connections (REST and WebSocket), and read/write to the local filesystem for building and logging. - Sanitization: The skill mentions using a
parseFigmaUrlfunction, but there is no evidence of robust sanitization or strict schema validation for the input data beyond extraction.
Audit Metadata