agent-project-orchestrator
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Documentation in
references/01-original-scaffold.mdidentifies that the reference filereferences/original/claude_code_deep_planning.txtcontains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text, which can be used to hide instructions from the user while influencing the AI agent. Additionally, the skill's primary function involves processing untrusted repository data, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/test_doctor.pyscript performs dynamic code loading of thedoctor.pyutility viaimportlib. This pattern of executing code from computed paths at runtime is a risk factor for unauthorized execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in
SKILL.mdand associated references direct the agent to execute a local Python script,scripts/doctor.py, for package validation and capability checks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill architecture is designed around several external, third-party dependencies for core reasoning tasks (e.g.,
mattpocock/skills,6missedcalls/ultraplan, andobra/superpowers). These represent unverifiable dependencies that are integrated into the agent's workflow.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata