agent-project-orchestrator

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Documentation in references/01-original-scaffold.md identifies that the reference file references/original/claude_code_deep_planning.txt contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text, which can be used to hide instructions from the user while influencing the AI agent. Additionally, the skill's primary function involves processing untrusted repository data, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The scripts/test_doctor.py script performs dynamic code loading of the doctor.py utility via importlib. This pattern of executing code from computed paths at runtime is a risk factor for unauthorized execution.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's instructions in SKILL.md and associated references direct the agent to execute a local Python script, scripts/doctor.py, for package validation and capability checks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill architecture is designed around several external, third-party dependencies for core reasoning tasks (e.g., mattpocock/skills, 6missedcalls/ultraplan, and obra/superpowers). These represent unverifiable dependencies that are integrated into the agent's workflow.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 13, 2026, 08:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — agent-project-orchestrator