quad-fact-check
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONINGDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill references non-existent and deceptive model versions, specifically "Claude Opus 4.6" and "gpt-5.3-codex". This misleading metadata may cause users to misjudge the skill's capabilities or potentially install unverified third-party tools masquerading as these official models.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill demonstrates a high attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted document content across multiple sub-agents.
- Ingestion points: In Step 2, the skill uses
cat <〃ぁいるぱす>to read the content of local files. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks delimiters (such as XML tags or triple backticks) or instructions to the sub-agents to disregard embedded commands within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands through the
geminiandcodexCLI tools. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the file content before it is passed to the sub-agents.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell command substitution
$(cat <〃ぁいるぱす>)to dynamically build the command string for thecodextool. If the content of the file being checked contains specific shell metacharacters (e.g., mismatched quotes followed by a semicolon), it could result in arbitrary command execution on the user's system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions rely on shell commands and pipes (
cat,gemini,codex,echo,|) to process data and interact with external AI services.
Audit Metadata