agentkit-orchestrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and act upon outputs from other AI agents (e.g., results from ak run and PLAN.md files), which constitutes a potential vulnerability surface.\n
  • Ingestion points: Agent execution results (result_text), execution transcripts, and shared planning documents (PLAN.md) are ingested across the orchestration loop.\n
  • Boundary markers: Instructions explicitly recommend using single quotes or quoted heredocs (e.g., <<'EOF') for task inputs to prevent shell expansion of agent-supplied text.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses git for worktree management, ak for agent execution, and herdr for interactive pane management.\n
  • Sanitization: The instructions emphasize that agent outputs are 'claims' rather than evidence, require verification via repository test suites/linters before merging, and state that agent replies never grant permissions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several command-line tools to perform its orchestration functions.\n
  • Evidence: Shell commands such as git worktree, ak pick, ak usage, and herdr pane are used throughout the documentation and scripts.\n
  • Safety Controls: The skill explicitly forbids the agent from answering credential prompts, creating profiles, or overriding user-configured permission postures (e.g., AGENTKIT_PERMISSIONS=ask).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 12, 2026, 02:53 AM