agentkit-orchestrate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process and act upon outputs from other AI agents (e.g., results from
ak runandPLAN.mdfiles), which constitutes a potential vulnerability surface.\n - Ingestion points: Agent execution results (
result_text), execution transcripts, and shared planning documents (PLAN.md) are ingested across the orchestration loop.\n - Boundary markers: Instructions explicitly recommend using single quotes or quoted heredocs (e.g.,
<<'EOF') for task inputs to prevent shell expansion of agent-supplied text.\n - Capability inventory: The skill uses
gitfor worktree management,akfor agent execution, andherdrfor interactive pane management.\n - Sanitization: The instructions emphasize that agent outputs are 'claims' rather than evidence, require verification via repository test suites/linters before merging, and state that agent replies never grant permissions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several command-line tools to perform its orchestration functions.\n
- Evidence: Shell commands such as
git worktree,ak pick,ak usage, andherdr paneare used throughout the documentation and scripts.\n - Safety Controls: The skill explicitly forbids the agent from answering credential prompts, creating profiles, or overriding user-configured permission postures (e.g.,
AGENTKIT_PERMISSIONS=ask).
Audit Metadata