source-to-skill-tree
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted external data (URLs, PDFs, documents), making it a target for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points:
references/source-ingestion.mdprovides instructions for browsing URLs and extracting content from local files such as PDFs, EPUBs, and Word documents to build a 'Source Inventory'. - Boundary markers: The workflow lacks explicit boundary markers or system-level instructions to ignore malicious directives that might be embedded within the source materials being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
ruby,find,diff) for quality assurance, which could be exploited if an injection influences the file paths or metadata being verified. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, validation, or escaping of source content is documented before it is transformed into executable 'workflows' or 'checks' in the generated skill files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to perform local command-line operations to verify the integrity and correctness of its outputs.
- Evidence: In
references/quality-gates.md, the skill instructs the use ofruby -ryaml -e 'p YAML.load_file(ARGV[0])["name"]' /path/to/SKILL.mdto validate frontmatter parsing. It also usesfindto verify the file tree anddiff -qrto ensure mirrored skill directories are consistent.
Audit Metadata