source-to-skill-tree

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted external data (URLs, PDFs, documents), making it a target for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: references/source-ingestion.md provides instructions for browsing URLs and extracting content from local files such as PDFs, EPUBs, and Word documents to build a 'Source Inventory'.
  • Boundary markers: The workflow lacks explicit boundary markers or system-level instructions to ignore malicious directives that might be embedded within the source materials being processed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (ruby, find, diff) for quality assurance, which could be exploited if an injection influences the file paths or metadata being verified.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, validation, or escaping of source content is documented before it is transformed into executable 'workflows' or 'checks' in the generated skill files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to perform local command-line operations to verify the integrity and correctness of its outputs.
  • Evidence: In references/quality-gates.md, the skill instructs the use of ruby -ryaml -e 'p YAML.load_file(ARGV[0])["name"]' /path/to/SKILL.md to validate frontmatter parsing. It also uses find to verify the file tree and diff -qr to ensure mirrored skill directories are consistent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 25, 2026, 10:59 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — source-to-skill-tree