ffmpeg-video-filter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
ffmpegbinary to perform video transformations. - Evidence: In
scripts/vfilter.py, the script usessubprocess.call(cmd)wherecmdis a list of command-line arguments. - Security Context: The use of argument lists instead of raw strings mitigates standard shell injection vulnerabilities. However, the script's
--custommode allows arbitrary filter strings to be passed to ffmpeg, which is a powerful engine capable of file system interactions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it processes untrusted data and translates it into powerful tool operations.
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts user-provided arguments through the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder inSKILL.mdand CLI flags inscripts/vfilter.py, such as--filter-stringand--input. - Capability inventory: The skill can read and write files on the local system via
ffmpeg. Certain ffmpeg filters (likedrawtextusing thetextfileoption) can be used to disclose the contents of local files. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement boundary markers or instructions to warn the agent about potentially malicious instructions embedded in the data it processes.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the input file paths or the custom filter strings, relying on the agent's internal guardrails to prevent misuse.
Audit Metadata