deck-forge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection via its reasoning loop integration.
- Ingestion points: The background subagent polls the local hub's bridge at
http://127.0.0.1:8765/api/agent/nextfor task kind and payload data (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when processing the API response. Mitigation relies on the agent's 'Iron Rule' to verify all cards against oracle text.
- Capability inventory: The agent is empowered to export deck data to the filesystem (
deck.json), execute other skills (/deck-strat,/lgs-search), and run shell commands. - Sanitization: The instructions do not specify any validation or sanitization of the payloads retrieved from the local bridge.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill's operational instructions require the agent to execute dynamically generated Python code via
python -cto communicate with the local server and parse JSON responses. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill setup and background heartbeat loop involve executing various shell commands (
uv sync,uv run,curl) within the user's terminal environment.
Audit Metadata