proxy-printer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-supplied data in the form of deck lists and Moxfield links, establishing a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.\n
- Ingestion points: The
parse-deckcommand accepts user-supplied files or links to process them into the internal deck schema.\n - Boundary markers:
SKILL.mddefines an 'Iron Rule' that prohibits the agent from using its own training data or user-supplied oracle text, mandating that all rendered content come from a verified Scryfall lookup.\n - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes CLI tools authorized to write to the local file system (PDF generation and art caching) and perform network requests to external domains.\n
- Sanitization: Input strings used for file lookups are converted into alphanumeric 'slugs' to prevent path manipulation attacks.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
fetch-artanddownload-mtgjsontools download card metadata and ASCII art from external domains, includingasciiart.euandasciiart.website.\n - Description: These downloads are contextually appropriate for the skill's primary function of providing card proxies and attributed artwork but target non-whitelisted third-party sources.
Audit Metadata