auto-board-task
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data that could contain hidden or adversarial instructions designed to override agent behavior during the workflow execution.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from GitHub Project (v2) boards via the
gh-project-synctool and Pull Request review comments via thepr-reviewerandreview-fixersub-agents (referenced inSKILL.mdandadr/0001-invoke-workflow-via-skill-not-agent.md). - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore embedded instructions within the project cards or PR comments being processed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
Bashtool and orchestrates tools (task-agent,review-fixer) that can write files, create/update GitHub issues and PRs, and interact with the filesystem. - Sanitization: The skill delegates validation to downstream tools, but does not explicitly specify sanitization of natural language content extracted from GitHub project cards or comments before interpolation into subsequent prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the agent to dynamically construct execution paths and argument strings at runtime.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md(Step 2 and Step 3), the agent is instructed to resolve${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}to an absolute path and assemble aSkilltool call by concatenating the workflow path with user-suppliedkey=valuearguments. - Risk: While standard for workflow orchestration, assembling command strings from runtime variables and user-controlled data presents a risk of argument injection if not strictly handled by the
workflowrunner.
Audit Metadata