The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection during its memory processing phases.
Ingestion points: Phase 4 reads untrusted data from .memplan/memory/overflow.mem, and Phase 5 processes content from questions.mem and checkpoint.mem.
Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or markers to separate the data content from agent instructions, nor do they specify that the agent should ignore potential commands embedded within the memory entries.
Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the Bash tool for environment checks and a local CLI tool (memplan-cli.js) to perform file rewrites, appends, and state updates across multiple files in the .memplan directory.
Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or escaping for the content extracted from the memory files before it is interpolated into commands or passed as arguments to the append operation.

review