task-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input from a YAML file and interpolates it into the instructions for a subagent.
- Ingestion points: The
agent-tasks.ymloragent-tasks.yamlfile parsed in Phase 1.1 provides theTASK_DESCRIPTION. - Boundary markers: The subagent prompt defined in Phase 3.3 lacks explicit delimiters (like XML tags or multi-line separators) or specific instructions to treat the task description as data rather than command instructions.
- Capability inventory: The subagent has permissions to read, write, and edit the codebase, while the parent agent can push changes and create GitHub pull requests using
mcp__github__create_pull_request. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation of the
TASK_DESCRIPTIONbefore it is passed to the subagent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands to manage the working environment and repository state.
- Evidence: Git operations such as
git clone,git fetch,git push, andgit checkoutare executed in Phases 2 and 3. - Evidence: Phase 5 performs a cleanup using
rm -rf "$WORKDIR", where the target directory is computed dynamically via a Python one-liner or environment variable.
Audit Metadata