google-blog-style
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The validation scripts (
scripts/validate_all.cjsandscripts/lint_style.cjs) usechild_process.execSyncto execute shell commands by concatenating the input draft path into a command string. Although the path is wrapped in double quotes, it is not properly escaped for shell metacharacters. This allows arbitrary command execution if a draft file is named using shell expansion syntax (e.g.,$(id).md). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (technical blog drafts) and lacks robust delimiters or sanitization to prevent embedded instructions from hijacking the agent's task logic. ● Ingestion points: Blog draft files read by the agent and validation scripts. ● Boundary markers: No explicit markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to wrap the processed draft content. ● Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts via
execSync, access the file system, and use the agent's toolset. ● Sanitization: Whilescripts/sanitize_blog.cjschecks for hardcoded credentials, it does not filter or sanitize the draft content for prompt injection markers.
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