skills/danicat/skills/swarm-coding/Gen Agent Trust Hub

swarm-coding

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the flow of untrusted user input from the ROOT Coordinator down to specialized subagents, creating a potential attack surface where instructions embedded in the task objective could influence subagent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided technical objectives and agent budgets are ingested by the ROOT Swarm Coordinator as described in SKILL.md and references/coordinator.md.
  • Boundary markers: The briefing templates (e.g., Coordinator -> Lead Agent Briefing Protocol) use markdown headers to structure the task but do not include explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate the untrusted objective from the subagent's operational instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Specialist subagents have access to run_command in a sandbox and write_file tools, while Lead Agents are permitted to use write_file for documentation purposes (as defined in the subagent manifests in assets/agents/).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation of the user-provided objectives before they are interpolated into the subagent briefing prompts.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the runtime generation and invocation of new agent contexts, which is a form of dynamic execution within the agent platform.
  • Evidence: The Coordinator and Lead Agents are instructed to dynamically register subagent types using define_subagent and initiate their execution via invoke_subagent, passing constructed prompt strings that include the task-specific details (referenced in references/coordinator.md and assets/agents/lead-agent.md).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 01:52 AM