swarm-coding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the flow of untrusted user input from the ROOT Coordinator down to specialized subagents, creating a potential attack surface where instructions embedded in the task objective could influence subagent behavior.
- Ingestion points: User-provided technical objectives and agent budgets are ingested by the ROOT Swarm Coordinator as described in SKILL.md and references/coordinator.md.
- Boundary markers: The briefing templates (e.g., Coordinator -> Lead Agent Briefing Protocol) use markdown headers to structure the task but do not include explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate the untrusted objective from the subagent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: Specialist subagents have access to
run_commandin a sandbox andwrite_filetools, while Lead Agents are permitted to usewrite_filefor documentation purposes (as defined in the subagent manifests in assets/agents/). - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or validation of the user-provided objectives before they are interpolated into the subagent briefing prompts.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the runtime generation and invocation of new agent contexts, which is a form of dynamic execution within the agent platform.
- Evidence: The Coordinator and Lead Agents are instructed to dynamically register subagent types using
define_subagentand initiate their execution viainvoke_subagent, passing constructed prompt strings that include the task-specific details (referenced in references/coordinator.md and assets/agents/lead-agent.md).
Audit Metadata