Council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied topics and external context which are interpolated into subagent prompts without explicit sanitization.
- Ingestion points: User-provided debate topics and context processed in
Workflows/Debate.mdandWorkflows/Quick.md, as well as configuration files read from~/.claude/LIFEOS/USER/CUSTOMIZATIONS/SKILLS/Council/. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates in
Workflows/Debate.mdandWorkflows/Quick.mdlack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within the user data. - Capability inventory: The skill spawns subagents using the
Agenttool, performs local network requests viacurl, and writes execution logs to the local file system. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is applied to user-controlled strings before they are included in subagent prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for utility purposes.
- Notifications: Shell commands using
curlare used to send JSON payloads tohttp://localhost:31337/notifyfor status updates. - Logging: Execution metadata is appended to
~/.claude/LIFEOS/MEMORY/SKILLS/execution.jsonlusing theechocommand. - Input flow: Both
curlandechocommands incorporate summaries or action descriptions derived from user input, which presents a risk of command injection if the agent does not properly escape the content.
Audit Metadata