skills/danielmiessler/lifeos/Council/Gen Agent Trust Hub

Council

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes user-supplied topics and external context which are interpolated into subagent prompts without explicit sanitization.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided debate topics and context processed in Workflows/Debate.md and Workflows/Quick.md, as well as configuration files read from ~/.claude/LIFEOS/USER/CUSTOMIZATIONS/SKILLS/Council/.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt templates in Workflows/Debate.md and Workflows/Quick.md lack explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore commands embedded within the user data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill spawns subagents using the Agent tool, performs local network requests via curl, and writes execution logs to the local file system.
  • Sanitization: No validation or escaping is applied to user-controlled strings before they are included in subagent prompts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands for utility purposes.
  • Notifications: Shell commands using curl are used to send JSON payloads to http://localhost:31337/notify for status updates.
  • Logging: Execution metadata is appended to ~/.claude/LIFEOS/MEMORY/SKILLS/execution.jsonl using the echo command.
  • Input flow: Both curl and echo commands incorporate summaries or action descriptions derived from user input, which presents a risk of command injection if the agent does not properly escape the content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:07 PM