ExtractWisdom
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's 'Execution Log' instruction specifies a shell command (
echo ... >> ...) that appends a summary of input (8_WORD_SUMMARY) to a local file. This summary is generated by the agent based on user input and is not sanitized for shell-active characters like single quotes, which could lead to arbitrary command execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the extraction workflow, the skill executes the
fabricCLI tool using the patternfabric -y "URL". Without strict validation or escaping of the user-provided URL, this pattern allows for shell command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources, which can contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: YouTube transcripts retrieved via
fabricand article content retrieved viaWebFetch. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are used to isolate ingested content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
fabric,echo) and read/write to the user's home directory (~/.claude/). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of external content is performed before processing.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill interacts with the local file system by reading user-specific customization files from
~/.claude/LIFEOS/USER/CUSTOMIZATIONS/and writing to an execution log in~/.claude/LIFEOS/MEMORY/SKILLS/execution.jsonl. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves content from external URLs (YouTube and articles) using the
fabrictool andWebFetch. While these are vendor-integrated tools, the lack of sanitization on the inputs provided to them is a security concern.
Audit Metadata