FirstPrinciples
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
curlto send notifications to a local service (http://localhost:31337/notify) andechoto append execution logs to a local file (~/.claude/LIFEOS/MEMORY/SKILLS/execution.jsonl). These operations occur automatically upon skill invocation and workflow completion. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to load and apply
PREFERENCES.mdand other resources from a specific local path (~/.claude/LIFEOS/USER/CUSTOMIZATIONS/SKILLS/FirstPrinciples/) to override default behavior. Loading and executing logic from user-controlled file paths can lead to unintended behavior modification. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates a summary of user-provided input (
8_WORD_SUMMARY) into a shellechocommand. If the agent generates a summary containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or single quotes) derived from malicious user input, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Workflow Routing and Execution Log instructions)
- Boundary markers: None provided for the interpolated
8_WORD_SUMMARY - Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
bashforcurlandecho - Sanitization: None; the skill lacks instructions to escape or validate the input summary before interpolation into the shell command
Audit Metadata