FirstPrinciples

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses curl to send notifications to a local service (http://localhost:31337/notify) and echo to append execution logs to a local file (~/.claude/LIFEOS/MEMORY/SKILLS/execution.jsonl). These operations occur automatically upon skill invocation and workflow completion.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to load and apply PREFERENCES.md and other resources from a specific local path (~/.claude/LIFEOS/USER/CUSTOMIZATIONS/SKILLS/FirstPrinciples/) to override default behavior. Loading and executing logic from user-controlled file paths can lead to unintended behavior modification.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates a summary of user-provided input (8_WORD_SUMMARY) into a shell echo command. If the agent generates a summary containing shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks, semicolons, or single quotes) derived from malicious user input, it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Workflow Routing and Execution Log instructions)
  • Boundary markers: None provided for the interpolated 8_WORD_SUMMARY
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via bash for curl and echo
  • Sanitization: None; the skill lacks instructions to escape or validate the input summary before interpolation into the shell command
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 2, 2026, 08:46 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — FirstPrinciples