Harvest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using user-supplied and agent-generated inputs without explicit sanitization.
- Evidence: In
Workflows/Harvest.md, the commandbun ~/.claude/skills/_HARVEST/Tools/harvest.ts "<original input>"passes raw user input directly to the shell as an argument. - Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the execution log commandecho '{"ts":"'$(date...)","input":"8_WORD_SUMMARY",...}' >> ...incorporates an agent-generated summary into a shell command, which could be exploited if the summary is influenced by malicious content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external content.
- Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from arbitrary URLs via
WebFetchand YouTube transcripts viafabric -yinWorkflows/Harvest.md(Step 2). - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define clear boundaries between instructions and untrusted data during the analysis phase (Step 3).
- Capability inventory: The agent can append to local files (
execution.jsonl) and execute a local script viabun(harvest.ts). - Sanitization: None. The workflow processes external data directly to extract ideas and patterns without filtering for embedded instructions.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill inherently relies on fetching content from external network sources.
- Evidence: The workflow utilizes
WebFetchfor articles andfabricfor YouTube content as defined inWorkflows/Harvest.md(Step 2).
Audit Metadata