skills/danielmiessler/lifeos/Harvest/Gen Agent Trust Hub

Harvest

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands using user-supplied and agent-generated inputs without explicit sanitization.
  • Evidence: In Workflows/Harvest.md, the command bun ~/.claude/skills/_HARVEST/Tools/harvest.ts "<original input>" passes raw user input directly to the shell as an argument.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, the execution log command echo '{"ts":"'$(date...)","input":"8_WORD_SUMMARY",...}' >> ... incorporates an agent-generated summary into a shell command, which could be exploited if the summary is influenced by malicious content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its processing of untrusted external content.
  • Ingestion points: Content is retrieved from arbitrary URLs via WebFetch and YouTube transcripts via fabric -y in Workflows/Harvest.md (Step 2).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define clear boundaries between instructions and untrusted data during the analysis phase (Step 3).
  • Capability inventory: The agent can append to local files (execution.jsonl) and execute a local script via bun (harvest.ts).
  • Sanitization: None. The workflow processes external data directly to extract ideas and patterns without filtering for embedded instructions.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill inherently relies on fetching content from external network sources.
  • Evidence: The workflow utilizes WebFetch for articles and fabric for YouTube content as defined in Workflows/Harvest.md (Step 2).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 20, 2026, 10:32 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — Harvest