Ideate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its architectural reliance on processing external research data.\n- Ingestion points: The
CONSUMEandSTEALphases (defined inFullCycle.md,QuickCycle.md, andSteal.md) utilize theResearchskill to gather information from external sources. TheMateandTestworkflows also ingest arbitrary idea pools from potentially untrusted user inputs.\n- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define delimiters or specific 'ignore' instructions to isolate ingested data, which could allow embedded commands to influence agent behavior.\n- Capability inventory: The skill can launch parallel sub-agents using theTasktool, write state and log information to the local file system (~/.claude/LIFEOS/), and perform local network notifications viacurltolocalhost.\n- Sanitization: No logic for sanitizing or escaping the content from external sources is specified before the data is interpolated into the agent's prompts.
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