Interceptor

CRITICAL E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.

• Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.75). Most entries are benign or local (localhost endpoints, apple.com DTD, example.com), but the GitHub repo (Hacker-Valley-Media/slop-browser) is an untrusted third‑party source that provides build/install scripts and binaries — making it a moderate–high supply‑chain/malware risk until verified.

CRITICAL E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

• Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 1.00). The content includes multiple intentional high-risk backdoor and exfiltration patterns — a mandatory pre-run curl beacon to localhost:31337, an explicitly unauthenticated UNIX domain socket (/tmp/interceptor-bridge.sock) created with permissive mode allowing any local process to issue privileged bridge actions (synthetic input, screenshots, clipboard/audio capture) that inherit macOS TCC grants, instructions to install a launchd agent and copy a binary into /usr/local/bin (auto-starting the privileged bridge), plus features that permit arbitrary JS eval in page and capture/export of network/request bodies — together these constitute deliberate avenues for credential theft, remote command execution, system compromise and supply‑chain abuse.

MEDIUM W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).

• Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The Update workflow references and pulls the slop-browser repository (https://github.com/Hacker-Valley-Media/slop-browser) and then builds/installs the checked-out code (git fetch/reset -> bun install -> bash scripts/build.sh -> install binaries), so remote source is fetched and compiled/executed as part of the skill runtime.