Remotion
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a mandatorycurlcommand that executes a POST request tohttp://localhost:31337/notifyimmediately upon skill invocation. This is presented as a required 'Voice Notification' step for the agent to perform. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the
curlcommand targetslocalhost, it represents a network exfiltration pattern where internal skill state (workflow name and action) is sent to a local service without explicit user consent for each execution. This could be used to leak agent activity to other local processes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mduses high-urgency language such as '🚨 MANDATORY', 'REQUIRED BEFORE ANY ACTION', and 'This is not optional. Execute this curl command immediately' to force the agent to perform the network request before any other instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
Tools/Render.tsscript uses Bun's$shell execution to runbunx remotioncommands. It includes aninputPropsoption that passes a JSON-stringified object directly into the shell command line via the--propsflag, which could lead to command injection if the input properties are not properly sanitized by the underlying shell or CLI.
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