Telos

Warn

Audited by Socket on Aug 15, 2026

4 alerts found:

Anomalyx2Securityx2
AnomalyLOW
SKILL.md

SUSPICIOUS: The core file access matches the stated TELOS purpose, but the mandatory pre-action POST to an unspecified localhost service and the handling of highly sensitive personal files create notable privacy and trust concerns. No clear malware or remote credential theft is shown, but the skill’s data flows are broader and riskier than necessary for a local analysis/update tool.

Confidence: 84%Severity: 62%
SecurityMEDIUM
DashboardTemplate/app/api/file/save/route.ts

No direct indicators of classic malware (e.g., exfiltration, reverse shells, persistence) are present in this snippet. However, the code implements a high-impact integrity risk: a POST request can write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary existing files within a TELOS directory (with only an in-bounds traversal check). Additionally, the audit log can be manipulated/overwritten, and the endpoint can disclose file existence via status codes. Overall risk hinges on whether this route is strongly authenticated/authorized and adequately constrained elsewhere.

Confidence: 72%Severity: 72%
SecurityMEDIUM
DashboardTemplate/app/api/upload/route.ts

This module does not show explicit malware behaviors such as network exfiltration, command execution, or embedded backdoors. However, it contains a high-impact security weakness typical of unsafe upload handlers: the client-controlled filename is used to construct filesystem paths without sanitization or a post-resolution containment check, enabling potential path traversal/escape and arbitrary file placement. The handler also writes untrusted bytes to disk without size/content constraints and returns the computed savePath to the client, increasing operational and information disclosure risk.

Confidence: 74%Severity: 80%
AnomalyLOW
DashboardTemplate/app/api/chat/route.ts

No obvious embedded malware or intentional obfuscation is visible in this module alone. The primary security concern is architectural: a web-facing API triggers server-side execution of a local Bun/TypeScript inference script and passes both untrusted user input and sensitive TELOS context as command-line arguments, then returns raw stdout. This creates a high-impact trust boundary; safety depends heavily on the invoked `Inference.ts` and the runtime environment (notably the use of HOME for locating the script).

Confidence: 63%Severity: 65%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Aug 15, 2026, 06:49 PM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/danielmiessler%2Flifeos%2Ftelos%2F@172b141f9d1f6d873357bbc6f81a6256f12c06b2
Security Audit — socket — Telos