new-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by reading user-supplied strings (such as the 'Scope note' and 'Controlled tag vocabulary') and writing them directly into a
CLAUDE.mdfile ormetadata/vocabulary.txt. These files are then used by the agent to determine behavior in subsequent sessions. An attacker-controlled media source could potentially include metadata designed to influence agent behavior when the workspace is cataloged. - Ingestion points: User prompts for 'Source path', 'Scope note', and 'Controlled tag vocabulary' (Step 6).
- Boundary markers: Not explicitly defined in the generated markdown or text files.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
mkdir,cp,git, andghtools (Step 4, 7). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or escaping of the user-provided strings is mentioned before writing to the workspace files.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands to scaffold the workspace and manage version control. While it uses
$ARGUMENTSfor naming, it uses standard tools likegitandgh. The risk is minimized by thedisable-model-invocation: trueflag in the frontmatter, which prevents the model from generating arbitrary code during the execution of this specific skill.
Audit Metadata