nanobanana
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a function to disable SSL certificate verification globally within the execution context. This is achieved by monkey-patching the
httpxlibrary's client initialization and overriding the default SSL context in the Pythonsslmodule. This feature is intended for environments with corporate proxies but can be exploited to facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted content from user-provided prompts and Google Search results.\n - Ingestion points: The
promptargument inscripts/generate.pyandscripts/batch_generate.py, and the output of Google Search grounding when enabled via the--searchflag.\n - Boundary markers: There are no protective delimiters or specific instructions provided to the underlying model to distinguish between the developer's instructions and potentially malicious instructions embedded in the prompt or search data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to read local image files (scripts/generate.py), write generated images to the local file system (scripts/generate.py), and communicate with external APIs (Google Gemini).\n
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform any validation, escaping, or sanitization of the prompt strings before they are passed to the Gemini API.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides Python scripts (
generate.py,batch_generate.py) that take arbitrary string prompts and file paths as arguments. This allows the agent to perform file system operations and network requests based on model output.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation instructs users to install external Python packages (google-genai,Pillow) from public registries to enable the skill's functionality.
Audit Metadata