gpt-image-2
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates raw user prompts into the instruction stream sent to the
codexCLI tool's standard input. - Ingestion points: The user-supplied
promptargument processed inscripts/gen.jsand used inscripts/image-gen.js. - Boundary markers: Absent; the user prompt is appended directly to an internal instruction template string.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
child_process.spawnto execute thecodexCLI, which processes these instructions. - Sanitization: No escaping, validation, or filtering is performed on the input prompt before interpolation.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the external
codexCLI tool via the Node.jschild_processmodule. - Evidence: The
runCodexfunction inscripts/image-gen.jsusesspawnto run the command found on the system path. - Security Note: While it passes arguments as an array (avoiding shell injection) and uses a
--sandbox read-onlyflag, it relies on the integrity of the localcodexinstallation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references the
codexCLI tool from OpenAI's official GitHub repository as a required external dependency.
Audit Metadata